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According to normative theories, reward-maximizing agents should
have consistent preferences. Thus, when faced with alternatives A, B,
and C, an individual preferring A to B and B to C should prefer A to C.
However, it has been widely argued that humans can incur losses by
violating this axiom of transitivity, despite strong evolutionary pres-
sure for reward-maximizing choices. Here, adopting a biologically
plausible computational framework, we show that intransitive (and
thus economically irrational) choices paradoxically improve accuracy
(and subsequent economic rewards) when decision formation is cor-
rupted by internal neural noise. Over three experiments, we show
that humans accumulate evidence over time using a “selective inte-
gration” policy that discards information about alternatives with mo-
mentarily lower value. This policy predicts violations of the axiom of
transitivity when three equally valued alternatives differ circularly in
their number of winning samples. We confirm this prediction in a
fourth experiment reporting significant violations of weak stochastic
transitivity in human observers. Crucially, we show that relying on
selective integration protects choices against “late” noise that other-
wise corrupts decision formation beyond the sensory stage. Indeed,
we report that individuals with higher late noise relied more strongly
on selective integration. These findings suggest that violations of ra-
tional choice theory reflect adaptive computations that have evolved
in response to irreducible noise during neural information processing.
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Daily decisions, such as choosing a holiday destination oraccepting a job offer, involve comparing alternatives that
are characterized by different attributes (1, 2). Understanding
how the brain combines information from different attributes
into unitary decision values is a key challenge in psychology and
the neurosciences (3, 4). From a normative perspective, the value
of an alternative should be independent of factors, such as the
attractiveness of competing alternatives or the context in which
preferences are elicited (5). Thus, the preference relationship
between two alternatives ought to remain stable, regardless of
changes to the choice set, incurred for example by the addition
or removal of other choice alternatives (6).
However, human preferences are often driven by irrelevant fac-
tors (7, 8). For instance, an initial preference for one holiday des-
tination (e.g., Bali) over another (e.g., Berlin) can reverse when an
inferior alternative (e.g., Dresden) is added to the choice set, even if
this “decoy” alternative is never chosen (9, 10). Similarly, an indi-
vidual preferring a holiday in Bali to Berlin, and Berlin to Boston,
will sometimes show a systematic “intransitive” (or inconsistent)
preference for Boston over Bali (11). A canonical argument states
that such violations of decision theory (hereafter “economic” or
“choice irrationality”) disclose fundamental limitations in human
processing capacity and of the executive system (12, 13). However,
this argument does not have an obvious normative justification.
Why did the computations that underlie irrational choices survive
millions of years of evolutionary pressure for optimal behaviors that
maximize reward? [The term “optimal” is most often used to refer
to a policy that yields the highest reward rate, given the likely
sources of uncertainty in the environment (e.g., the performance-
limiting visibility of a stimulus), and the structure of the task (e.g.
the monetary payoff for one action over another). Where in-
dependent variables are often economic goods of unknown
subjective worth, an optimal policy may be hard to specify, but a
rational policy can be defined as one that discloses stable and
consistent preferences, as if agents made choices by maximizing
a latent subjective utility function.]
Here, we describe an alternative theory, known as “selective
integration” (14), that overcomes this challenge by offering a
normative justification of choice irrationality. Building on psy-
chophysical research into the neural and computational mecha-
nisms by which decisions are formed via sequential sampling (15),
we assume that choice attributes (e.g., the expense, weather, or
culture encountered on holiday) are sampled in turn (2), and in-
tegrated toward a cumulative decision variable (16). Under se-
lective integration, the gain of processing on each attribute i of an
alternative depends on its rank within that attribute, with a se-
lective gating parameter w (0 < w <1) controlling the reduction in
gain for the weakest attribute value (e.g., Bi when A, B are offered
and Ai > Bi ). Selective integration thus makes decisions sensitive
to the relative ranks of the alternatives within each attribute, over
and above their cumulative average value.
Significance
Healthy individuals appear to display inconsistent preferences,
preferring A over B, B over C, and C over A. Inconsistent, in-
transitive preferences of this form are hallmark manifestations
of irrational choice behavior and breach the very assumptions
of economic theory. Nevertheless, the neurocognitive mecha-
nisms that mediate the formation of intransitive preferences
remain elusive. We show that intransitivity arises from a bot-
tleneck mechanism that blocks the processing of momentarily
less valuable information. Although this algorithm is by classical
definitions suboptimal (permitting the loss of information),
we theoretically and empirically demonstrate that it leads to better
decisions when accuracy can be compromised by neural noise be-
yond the sensory stage. Thus, contrary to common belief, choice
irrationality is a by-product of purposeful neural computations.
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Previously, we showed that, when a third (decoy) alternative
(D) alters the ranking of two existing alternatives, A and B, the
model successfully predicts a preference reversal, despite the fact
that the attribute values of A and B remain intact (Table S1) (14).
In the current report, we show that selective integration also ex-
plains intransitive choice behavior in humans. Using a psycho-
physical experimental approach, we show that intransitivity can be
provoked in most individuals by simple changes to the relative
ordering of the decision information, as predicted by selective in-
tegration. Critically, however, using a computational simulation
based on the sequential sampling framework, we demonstrate that
selective integration paradoxically maximizes the accuracy (and
subsequent economic outcomes) in the presence of “late” internal
noise arising during decision formation, beyond the sensory stage.
Importantly, we show that humans with higher estimated late noise
are more prone to integrate selectively. Together, these findings
offer a biologically viable, descriptively extended, and normatively
motivated explanation of economic irrationality.
Results
Selective Integration and Intransitivity. Under a popular computa-
tional framework, decisions between competing alternatives are
optimized via sequential sampling and integration (17, 18). In
choices between multiattribute economic alternatives, such as
holidays, this involves sampling attributes in turn (e.g., expense,
weather, culture), accumulating their respective values for each
alternative (e.g., Bali, Berlin), and comparing the resulting cumu-
lative decision values to select an action (19). We implement se-
lective integration by adding to this framework a “selective gating”
parameter, w, which reduces the gain of accumulation for the
weaker attribute value (e.g., weather in Berlin) on each sample
from 1 (lossless processing, which is optimal according to decision
theory) to 1 − w (Fig. 1A and Methods). [An equivalent imple-
mentation of selective integration would overweight the stronger
attribute value, leaving intact the weaker value. Although this
implementation is functionally analogous to the one depicted in
Fig. 1A, the two differ in terms of metabolic costs: discounting the
value of the local loser engenders a reduction in neural firing rate in
contrast to the more costly strategy of amplifying the value (and
associated firing rate) of the local winner. Because the experiments
presented here were not designed to dissociate these two imple-
mentations, we chose to adhere to the less costly one.] After gating
(where w > 0), the cumulative value of each alternative is not only a
function of its attribute values, as normative theory prescribes, but
also a function of the ordinal positions of these values within the
different attributes (e.g., Table S1).
To illustrate how violations of choice rationality in decisions
between two alternatives can arise from selective integration,
consider two equally valued alternatives (e.g., A and B in Fig. 1B)
that differ along three equally important attributes, which are
sampled in turn. For w > 0, the alternative with two (out of
three) winning attributes (A) will (on average) be chosen over an
alternative that wins by a larger margin on a single attribute (B),
because the input to the latter is more often dampened yielding a
lower cumulative value. Thus, when the same three values are
permuted circularly in three alternatives, the model predicts a
violation of “weak stochastic transitivity” (WST) (11, 20): A is
chosen more often over B, B over C, and C over A (Fig. 1B;
Table S2 for an illustration).
Violations of WST are not only incompatible with normative
theories but also with a large class of descriptive theories of
choice in which preference tendencies are perturbed by normally
distributed noise (16, 21). Thus, when empirically obtained, such
violations offer important theoretical constraints. Although WST
violations have been reported in humans (11), recent research
has shown that the vast majority of these putative violations were
not statistically significant when a more appropriate statistical
test is applied (20, 22). It is thus an empirical question whether
intransitivity, as predicted by our framework, will occur in human
observers. Before examining whether humans violate WST in
the direction predicted by our model, we first set out to examine
how well selective integration characterizes the way humans
accumulate evidence over time while forming preferences for
different alternatives.
Selective Integration in a Psychophysical Task. We gathered data
from human participants performing a psychophysical choice
task with real economic incentives for accurate choices (Fig. 2A;
Methods). In experiment 1, participants (n = 28) chose between
two alternatives each characterized by nine sequentially occur-
ring bars of different heights, presented in two simultaneous
streams (at a rate of 400 ms per frame) on the left and right of
the screen (Fig. 2A). Participants were instructed that the two
bars in each presentation frame correspond to two “attribute”
values as in the example of Fig. 1B. At the end of each trial, they
were asked to choose the stream with the larger average height,
receiving monetary reward proportional to their choice accuracy.
Using the notation A→B to indicate that “alternative A has more
winning attributes than B” [here, six vs. three winning attributes],
we constructed sequences of equal average value, such that
A→B, B→C, and C→A, as in the alternatives in Fig. 1B (“cyclic”
trials). Although participants performed the task accurately
(range of 62–92% correct on intermixed “standard” trials where
the attribute values were randomly generated from Gaussian
distributions), they exhibited a higher preference for the frequently
winning stream in the cyclic trials, as predicted by the model [Fig.
2B; P(Aj{A,B}) = 0.61, P(Bj{B, C}) = 0.63, P(Cj{A,C}) = 0.62,
and P < 0.001 for all comparisons to chance; significant frequent-
winner effect in 17 out of 28 participants; SI Results].
On a further intermixed set of “increment” trials, we increased
the average bar height in either the frequently winning (e.g., A
when A→B) or the frequently losing (e.g., B when A→B) streams,
breaking the tie without altering the relative proportion of win-
ning attributes (2:1 in favor of A). Participants were more likely
to choose the stream with the increment in both cases (Fig. 2C;
P < 0.001)—being sensitive to the average height difference and
not merely the difference in the number of winning attributes—
but accuracy was higher when the increment occurred in the
frequently winning than the frequently losing stream (P < 0.001).
These “frequent-winner” effects in cyclic and increment trials
were highly correlated across the cohort (r = 0.75, P < 0.001; Fig.
2D) and both correlated positively with participants’ estimated
w (r = 0.66 in cyclic; r = 0.68 in increment; P < 0.001 in both)
(model-fitting procedures and results in SI Methods and Fig. S1).
A B
Fig. 1. Selective integration and intransitivity. (A) Schematic of the selective
integration model. On each time step, the values of two different alterna-
tives on a single attribute are considered. Input samples (IA, IB), corre-
sponding to attribute values, feed to a bottleneck that discounts the gain of
the weakest sample (via selective gating, w) before relaying the inputs to
the accumulators (YA, YB). Noise can arise both at the input (σ) and accu-
mulation levels (ξ). (B) Choice probability for different values of w and for
σ = ξ = 2, for pairwise comparisons between three equally valued multi-
attribute alternatives (table). A→B: A wins in more samples than B. WST is
violated for w > 0 [i.e., P(Aj{A,B}) > 0.5, P(Bj{B,C}) > 0.5, P(Aj{A,C}) < 0.5, with
P(Xj{X,Y}) denoting the probability of choosing X over Y].
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A tendency to prefer the frequently winning stream could be
explained by normalization theories (Table S3) that attribute
some aspects of choice irrationality on efficient neural coding
schemas [i.e., divisive (23) or range-normalization (24) applied
on each pair of values before accumulation]. Similarly, a simpler
“majority of confirming dimensions” (MCD) rule that decides
based on the total number of local winners (25) could also ex-
plain the frequent-winner effect (Table S3). One unique sig-
nature of selective integration is that in choices between two
alternatives with equal mean value but different variances, it
predicts a higher preference for the high-variance alternative.
This “provariance” effect has been empirically verified elsewhere
(14) but was also observed in the current experiment. When the
two alternatives had different variances, accuracy was higher
when the high variance was assigned to the correct alternative
compared with trials where the correct alternative had low var-
iance [standard conditions 3 and 4 in SI Methods; accuracy dif-
ference between 3 and 4: mean ± SEM = 0.23 ± 0.03; P < 0.001].
As shown in Table S4, the provariance effect cannot be captured
by normalization theories or by MCD (Fig. S1B).
Finally, in two further experiments, we examined whether par-
ticipants adopted a w > 0 due to the lack of processing resources or
the scarcity of information, as theories of bounded rationality
would advocate (13). When we slowed the presentation rate to
1 Hz (experiment 2), we obtained a similar frequent-winner effect,
suggesting that selective gating does not just reflect a processing
bottleneck due to the rapid stimulus presentation (Fig. S2A). When
we increased the sequence length from few (6) to many (12)
samples (experiment 3), the frequent-winner effect increased in
the latter (Fig. S2B), indicating that the tendency to discount
losing values does not decrease when more information (samples)
is available, contrary to the predictions of heuristic models (26).
Systematic Violations of WST in Human Observers. As shown in Fig.
1B, selective integration violates the principle of WST. The
preference patterns in the cyclic trials in experiment 1 offer a
widely used proxy for the degree of intransitivity; the conclusion
that such patterns definitively violate WST can, however, be
challenged in statistical grounds (20). [Cyclic trials were cre-
ated using n different A, B, C triplets (Methods). Participants
encountered the three pairwise comparisons for each triplet only
once. We could count in how many triplets per participant
an intransitive circle was obtained. However, the statistical
interpretation of this metric of intransitivity, based on pattern
counting, is limited and controversial as explained elsewhere
(20). Thus the design of experiment 1 was not suitable for rig-
orous examination of WST violations.] We thus adjusted the
experimental design to rigorously assess WST violations within
individuals (experiment 4). Participants (N = 21) chose between
pairs of alternatives—each corresponding to a job candidate—
characterized by three sequentially presented pairs of bars
(Methods). Each pair of bars was presented within a colored
outline, with the color indicating an explicitly defined choice
dimension (Fig. S2C). The presentation order of the different
dimensions was randomized on each trial. The main departure
from experiment 1 was that, for each participant, three unique
cyclic trials (A vs. B, B vs. C, and A vs. C) were constructed based
on a single A–B–C triplet and presented several times, as in
multiattribute or risky choice studies of intransitivity (11, 20).
Accuracy in standard trials ranged from 85% to 98%, whereas
significant frequent-winner effects were detected in both cyclic
(Fig. S2D; P < 0.001 in all three comparisons of the frequent-
winning option to chance; frequent-winner effect significant in 15
out of 21 participants; SI Results) and increment trials (Fig. S2E;
P < 0.001). As in experiment 1, the two frequent-winner effects
were correlated to each other (r = 0.86; P < 0.001) and to the
selective gating parameter in the model (r = 0.89 in cyclic; r =
0.96 in increment; P < 0.001 in both). A significant provariance
effect was observed in standard trials (0.04 ± 0.01; P < 0.003),
ruling out MCD and normalization models. Finally, 11 out of 21
participants violated WST significantly (Table S5). The proba-
bility that all these 11 participants corresponded to a type I error
is extremely low (P = 1.1 × 10−9). A detailed presentation of
these individual-level analyses is given in SI Methods and SI
Results. [It has been recently argued that WST violations can
occur spuriously (20). As a remedy, a more stringent test, against
the so-called “triangle inequality,” has been prescribed. Three
participants were intransitive according to this test. However, this
test does not seem suitable for our study. First, the chances that the
reported WST violations occurred spuriously in our psychophysical
task are negligible (Fig. S3 and SI Results). Second, the test is
conservative in the sense that it would fail to detect real in-
transitivity effects that, although substantial, are below a cer-
tain magnitude due to the presence of experimental noise.]
Selective Integration and Decision Accuracy in the Face of Late Noise.
Why do humans discount locally weaker values, provoking in-
transitive choices (experiment 4) and other violations of eco-
nomic rationality (14)? We next compared the accuracy (and
consequent rewards) that is obtained under selective (w > 0) and
lossless integration (w = 0), simulating an experimental setting
in which the attribute values of the two alternatives are gener-
ated from two Gaussian distributions with the same variance
(σ) and different means (Fig. 3A). This setting is equivalent to
a two-alternative forced-choice paradigm (15, 17), where one-
dimensional quantities (e.g., perceptual signals or economic
values of magnitude IA, IB) are corrupted by noise, which arises
early, before their accumulation (27) (Fig. 1A, lower box). In ad-
dition to variability at the input level (which can be both due to
early internal noise and due to exogenous fluctuations in the stimuli
values), we assumed that noise could also arise late, at the level of
accumulation (i.e., decision noise ξ; Fig. 1A, upper box) (28).
When late noise is absent and early noise is present (Fig. 3B,
top blue line), integrating samples with equal gain (w = 0) is
optimal as postulated by statistical decision theory (15, 17, 28).
Most surprisingly, however, when late noise is also present,
maximum accuracy is achieved for w > 0, with the value of w that
maximizes accuracy increasing with late noise (Fig. 3B, black
circles). [The situation reverses and the optimal w regresses to-
ward 0 as the level of early noise increases. This happens be-
cause, when early noise is heightened, selective integration is
B C D
A
Fig. 2. Behavioral task and selective integration. (A) Trial schematic in experi-
ment 1. Participants (n = 28) viewed two streams of bars and had to choose
which stream was overall highest. (B) Mean choices in cyclic trials in experiment
1 (Fig. 1B) revealed a frequent-winner effect: A was chosen more often over B,
B over C, and C over A. (C) Accuracy in increment trials, where the samples of
either the frequently winning or the frequently losing stream were increased by
a constant (A+ vs. B and A vs. B+, respectively). The difference in accuracy be-
tween the A+ vs. B and the A vs. B+ trials also revealed a frequent-winner effect.
(D) The frequent-winner effect in cyclic ([P(Aj{A,B})+P(Bj{B, C})+P(Cj{A,C})]/3–0.5)
and increment trials [P(A+j{A+,B}) – P(B+j{A,B+})] correlated positively to each
other. Filled circles correspond to different participants. Grey curve is the
linear regression line. Error bars are 2 SEM. ***P < 0.001.
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more costly operating almost at random, given that the “fre-
quency of winning” becomes less predictive of the identity of the
correct alternative (Fig. S4A).] Why does selective integra-
tion confer an improvement in accuracy in the face of heightened
late noise? On average, discounting locally weaker attribute
values via selective gating exaggerates the accumulated differ-
ences between higher-valued (typically, frequently winning) and
lower-valued (typically, frequently losing) alternatives (Fig. 3C
for a simulated trial example). This policy occasionally inflates a
lower-valued alternative over its higher-valued rival (i.e., when
the former is the local winner more often), leading to a slight
cost in accuracy relative to lossless integration. When late noise
is present, however, the benefit of inflating the accumulated
differences offsets this cost.
In Fig. 3D, we illustrate this point by plotting the bivariate
end-state distributions of the two accumulators, under no late
noise (top panels) and high (bottom panels) late noise. Relative
to lossless integration (w = 0), selective integration (w = 0.5)
drives accumulator states away from the equality line (density
right to the line corresponds to percentage of choice errors),
yielding more robust preference states and thus higher perfor-
mance under late noise (bottom left/right panels, percent accu-
racies signaled on each panel). This robustness is comparable to
that observed in nonparametric statistics, where inferences de-
pend on the ranked data, whereas the mechanism is related to
the heightened signal-to-noise ratio in chains of neural pop-
ulations when the gain of individual neurons increases (29). Thus,
when noise arises at different stages of the processing hierarchy,
selective integration—although it ignores part of the input and
leads to violations of transitivity—can outperform the lossless in-
tegration algorithm (15, 17) by acting against late noise.
Selective Gating and Late Noise Relationship in Human Observers.
Finally, we interrogated the behavioral data to test whether se-
lective integration might be an adaptation specifically evolved to
counteract late noise during integration. If so, individuals with
higher late noise should have a higher selective gating parameter
as depicted in Fig. 3B. We fitted three variants of the selective
integration model that differed in their assumptions about the
source of internal noise: (i) a full model, having both early and
late noise; (ii) a model with early noise only; and (iii) a model
with late noise only (SI Methods). The early noise in the model
corresponded to extra internal noise applied at the input rep-
resentation stage, on top of the stimulus external variability. We
factored in the latter by fitting the models using the actual sto-
chastic input that participants saw in the experiments. In addi-
tion to noise and selective gating (w) parameters, all variants had
a leak parameter to capture the recency effect (14) that was
observed in all experiments (Fig. S1A).
In all experiments, model comparison favored the selective
integration variant that omitted early noise (variant iii) (Fig. S1
B–E). Furthermore, examining the noise parameters in the full
model (i) revealed that late noise was significantly higher than
early noise, with the latter having a negligible magnitude (Fig.
S1F). After verifying our fitting method with regards to param-
eter recovery (Fig. S4 B and C, and SI Methods), we found a
positive correlation between participants’ estimated late noise
and selective gating in all experiments (experiments 1–4: r = 0.63,
P < 0.001, r = 0.80; P < 0.001, r = 0.52; P < 0.006; r = 0.81; P <
0.001; Fig. 4A, scatterplot for all experiments). We ruled out the
possibility that this correlation occurred as an artifact of the
parameter estimation method, by reporting no relationship (r =
0.03; P = 0.502) between estimated late noise and w in simulated
datasets (Fig. 4B and SI Methods). This finding indicates that se-
lective gating has an adaptive role, being adjusted to each individ-
ual’s late noise levels, in the service of reward-maximizing decisions.
Discussion
Violations of the axioms of choice rationality have been ex-
haustively documented in the decision-making literature (2, 7,
9–11, 24). Numerous studies have found that the subjective value of
an economic prospect depends not only on its own attribute
values but also on the irrelevant context provided by competing
alternatives. Although this relative (rather than absolute) valu-
ation schema is incorporated in descriptive theories of choice
(3), and is reflected in neural signals recorded both from single
cells (30) and whole-brain areas (31), it currently lacks a plau-
sible normative explanation. Instead, violations of choice ratio-
nality appear to have negative repercussions, potentially leading
to a continuous drain on resources, for example to what eco-
nomic theory knows as a “money pump” (6).
Here, we argue that choice irrationality occurs because of
selective integration, a policy that explicitly discards some in-
formation about the rival choice alternatives but paradoxically
maximizes reward in the face of decision noise. Selective in-
tegration builds on an established framework for understanding
both perceptual (15, 17) and economic decisions (16, 32), in
which momentary decision values (e.g., sensory samples of a
noisy stimulus, or attributes values for an economic prospect) are
accumulated in parallel for two or more alternatives, corrupted
by noise that could arise either during encoding or during in-
formation integration (28). The additional assumption of the
model is that, where attributes compete locally, the winner can
be integrated with relatively higher gain. Thus, when contem-
plating the (excellent) weather in Bali, the (reasonable) weather
in rival Berlin appears poor by comparison, and does not drive a
positive evaluation of a Berlin holiday as much as it should.
Selective integration predicts that violations of transitivity will
occur when choice alternatives differ circularly in their number
of winning attributes. Here, we verified this prediction empiri-
cally, showing that humans performing a magnitude discrimina-
tion task make intransitive choices about alternatives with equal
cumulative value. Normalization or heuristic models could explain
A
B D
C
Fig. 3. Selective integration and decision accuracy. (A) The input distribu-
tions in a typical two-alternative forced-choice scenario. The SD of the dis-
tributions (σ) corresponds to early noise. (B) Decision accuracy in the model
for the scenario in A, as a function of w, for different levels of late noise
(ξ; curves) and after 12 accumulation steps (t). Black circles indicate the value
of w that maximizes accuracy for a given level of late noise. (C) Example
input (Top) and single-trial accumulator states (Bottom) for lossless (Left)
and selective integration (Right). The input parameters are as in A, and late
noise was absent. (D) Bivariate end-state (t = 12) accumulator distributions
for the choice problem in A, for lossless (Left) and selective integration
(Right). (Top) ξ = 0. (Bottom) ξ = 15. Density to the Left of dashed diagonal
corresponds to accuracy (in percentage). Higher density is depicted with red,
and lower density with blue.
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a tendency to choose a frequently winning alternative and hence
intransitive choices in our task, but they fail to explain other
aspects of the data such as why participants prefer high-variance
to low-variance alternatives. It has been recently shown that most
of the past instances of intransitivity could have been caused by
spurious factors and not necessarily by decision processes that vi-
olate economic rationality (20, 22). Our well-controlled psycho-
physical task together with computational modeling suggests that
the systematic intransitivity reported here is not caused by spurious
factors but by the tendency to integrate information selectively.
In sharp contrast to the mainstay in decision theory—which
considers reward-rate optimal the algorithm that accumulates all
available information without loss (17)—selective integration
maximizes accuracy (and subsequent rewards) in the face of
heightened late noise. The model achieves so by implicitly ex-
aggerating monetary differences (i.e., via weakening the losing
input), inflating the average accumulated difference between the
correct and incorrect alternative. Fitting the model to human
data revealed a strong positive correlation between late noise
and the tendency to integrate selectively. This correlation sug-
gests that observers use selective integration as a compensatory
mechanism to alleviate the potentially negative impact of ele-
vated accumulation noise. Violations of the axioms of choice
rationality emerge as a side effect of this policy and occur when
alternatives are structured in unusual ways [e.g., when the
number of winning attributes differ circularly or when dominated
decoys are introduced in the choice set (9)].
It is conceivable that explicit and equal increase of the gain of
processing for both inputs, if strong enough, could outperform
selective integration by cancelling out late noise. In our analyses,
however, we assumed that such direct and unbounded gain am-
plification is not plausible because organisms operate within
computational and metabolic constraints (33). Due to these con-
straints, even under conditions of increased vigilance behavioral
and neural variability perseveres (34), indicating that a portion of
internal noise is virtually irreducible. The way our model acts
against this (otherwise-irreducible) noise presents a paradox for
decision theory analogous to “less-is-more” effects in other do-
mains (35), whereby ignoring part of the available information
leads to better performance. Thus, in contrast to normalization
theories (23, 24), in which accuracy and metabolic efficiency trade
off against each other, selective integration increases choice accu-
racy while reducing the cost of information processing.
Our account of choice irrationality is not only normatively
motivated but also builds on well-established psychological and
neural principles. First, as in models of selective attention and
visual search (36), our explanation incorporates selective pro-
cessing. Although selective processing has been recently added
to an influential evidence accumulation model to explain the
increased accumulation rate for visually fixated alternatives (32),
our approach differs in that gain modulation is determined by
the value of the incoming information rather than merely by the
(random) locus of fixation. Second, our account is biologically
plausible, building upon two widely accepted neurobiological
facts: that decisions are realized in a hierarchy of cortical layers
and that processing at each layer is corrupted by independent
neuronal noise (29, 37). It is the distributed and noisy nature of
neural information processing that allows nonnormative choice
algorithms, such as selective integration, to practically outper-
form the normative benchmark.
Why humans make irrational choices has puzzled economists
and psychologists for decades. The findings described here
suggest that violations of choice rationality are a natural con-
sequence of selective gating—a processing bottleneck that
discounts locally weaker samples when evidence is accumulated
over time. We demonstrated that this bottleneck could protect
decisions from the pernicious influence of late noise—that
arising downstream from the input representation stage. Such
late noise may be an indispensable feature of neural compu-
tation, perhaps because it promotes learning and exploratory
behavior (38). Fitting selective integration to human choices, we
indeed showed that selective gating was stronger in those individ-
uals with higher late noise. This finding calls into question the long-
standing argument that humans are irrational because they lack the
computational resources to engage in effortful executive processes
and fall back instead on less costly, intuitive strategies or heuristics
(12). We suggest instead that apparently irrational choices may
stem from an evolutionary pressure for reward-maximizing deci-
sions, realized in a hierarchy of noisy cortical layers (29). This calls
for a broader theory of ecological rationality (39) that is bounded
by neurophysiological constraints.
Methods
Participants.Ninety-three participants (42 females; age range: 18–50; N1 = 28,
N2 = 17, N3 = 27, and N4 = 21 in experiments 1–4, respectively) were
recruited from Oxford University (experiments 1–3) and Warwick University
(experiment 4) participant pools and gave informed consent to take part. All
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of
neurological or psychiatric impairment. The experimental procedures were
approved by the Oxford University Medical Sciences Division Ethics Com-
mittee (approval no. MSD/IDREC/C1/2009/1) and Warwick University Hu-
manities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Sub-Committee (approval no.
83/14-15:DR@W). Participants received £8/h for their participation and a
bonus of £15 that was subject to task performance.
Task. In all experiments, participants viewed two streams of bars of varying
height presented simultaneously left and right from a central fixation point.
Bar height was described as indicating the scores of two job candidates on
different dimensions. In all experiments, participants were instructed that all
dimensions are equally important. The dimensions were explicitly specified
(i.e., intelligence, motivation, experience of a job candidate) and explicitly
announced during stimuli presentation via changes in the color of a rect-
angular outline only in experiment 4 (SI Methods). After a fixed number of pairs
of bars presented at a fixed rate, participants were asked to choose which
stream (candidate), the left or the right, had on average higher bars (scores).
Participants received partial feedback in experiments 1 and 4, and full feedback
in experiments 2 and 3 (SI Methods) in 8 (experiments 1–3) or 18 (experiment 4)
blocks (each lasting less than 10 min). At the end of the experiment, partici-
pants viewed their average accuracy on the screen, and if it fell within the 85th
percentile of the cohort, they received a bonus of £15. A detailed description of
the visual stimuli and trial time course is provided in SI Methods.
Outline of Experimental Conditions. Experiment 1 consisted of nine conditions
that differed in the way the two sequences were constructed. We classify the
different conditions into cyclic (three conditions), increment (two conditions),
and standard (four conditions). Cyclic trials were constructed based on a set of
sequences that resembled the A–B–C alternatives in Fig. 1B. Cyclic trials were
divided in three conditions: (i) A vs. B, (ii) B vs. C, and (iii) A vs. C. There were n
unique Aj–Bj–Cj triplets (j = 1. . .n), with each triplet yielding one set of cyclic
(i–iii ) trials. Twelve participants performed a short version of the task with
cyclic trials being generated by n = 40 unique triplets, whereas 16 participants
performed a longer version with n = 60 (SI Methods). In each Aj–Bj–Cj triplet,
the three sequences had identical values, but their order was reshuffled as per
A B
Fig. 4. Relationship between selective gating and late noise. (A) Estimated
selective gating parameters for each individual (circles) in all four experi-
ments (n = 93) plotted against estimated late noise parameters. (B) Same as
A, but for simulated data (see Fig. S4 B and C and SI Methods). Gray curves
are linear regression lines. ***P < 0.001.
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the example in Fig. 1B (i.e., Bjwas created via a right circular shift of Aj, whereas
Cj via a right circular shift of Bj ; see SI Methods). The two increment con-
ditions were created by modifying i above, by increasing by 6 pixels either
the height of all bars of Aj (A+ vs. B) or all bars of Bj (A vs. B+). Finally, in
standard trials, the two alternatives consisted of normally distributed values.
Two levels of mean and variance (high/low) were resampled with replacement,
yielding overall four conditions. Experiments 2 and 3 consisted only of in-
crement and standard trials (six conditions). Experiment 4 was similar to ex-
periment 1 and had all nine conditions. However, cyclic trials in experiment 4
were constructed from a unique (per participant) A–B–C triplet, with each
A–B–C sequence having the very same dimensional values in the whole ex-
periment. The dimensions in experiment 4 were explicitly specified and an-
nounced alongside the presentation of the bars. Details about the
experimental conditions, the sequences construction, and the number of
trials per condition in the four experiments are provided in SI Methods.
Selective Integration. Two accumulators (YA and YB) integrate the attribute
values (i.e., pixels representing the heights of the two bars) of the two se-
quences (A and B) according to the following difference equations:
YAðtÞ= ð1− λÞ ·YAðt− 1Þ+ IAðtÞ+ ξ · ζAðtÞ,
YBðtÞ= ð1− λÞ ·YBðt − 1Þ+ IBðtÞ+ ξ · ζBðtÞ. [1]
In the above, t denotes the current discrete time step, λ is integration leak,
ξ is late noise, and ζA,BðtÞ are random standard Gaussian samples in-
dependent of each other and across t. The leak parameter was introduced to
capture the recency-weighting profile (Fig. S1A) that was obtained in all
experiments (see also ref. 14).
The two accumulators are initialized at 0:
YAð0Þ=YBð0Þ= 0.
The momentary inputs to the accumulators, IA, B(t), are defined as follows:
IAðtÞ= θðXAðtÞ−XBðtÞÞ ·XAðtÞ,
IBðtÞ= θðXBðtÞ−XAðtÞÞ ·XBðtÞ. [2]
The gain function θ is a step function defined as follows:
θðxÞ=

1,   if  x > 0
w,   if  x < 0
, [3]
with w in [0, 1] being the selective gating parameter. Finally, XA, B(t) cor-
respond to the incoming stimuli corrupted by internal (early) noise:
XAðtÞ= σ · ρAðtÞ+ sAðtÞ,
XBðtÞ= σ · ρBðtÞ+ sBðtÞ, [4]
where σ is the early noise parameter, ρA, B(t) are random standard Gaussian
samples independent of each other and across t, and sA, B(t) are the pre-
sented stimuli on time step t (bar heights, in pixels).
At the end of stimuli presentation (e.g., t = 9, in experiment 1), the model
chooses sequence A if YAðtÞ>YBðtÞ, sequence B if YBðtÞ>YAðtÞ, and ran-
domly between A and B if YAðtÞ=YBðtÞ. Overall, the full selective integration
model has four free parameters: leak (λ), early noise (σ), late noise (ξ), and se-
lective gating parameter (w). Noise parameters are expressed in pixels.
Model-fitting procedures andmodel parameters in the various simulations
reported in the main text are given in SI Methods.
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SI Methods
Stimuli. The visual stimuli were presented using Psychophysics-3
Toolbox (40) running in Matlab (MathWorks, 2012) on 17”
monitors (1,024 × 768-px screen resolution and 60-Hz refresh
rate). Participants viewed the stimuli in a dimly lit room from
60-cm distance. The stimuli consisted of two series of white bars
presented within two fixed-height black rectangular placeholders
(width, 60 px/15 mm/1.5° visual angle; height, 200 px/50 mm/5.0°
visual angle) separated by 80 px/20 mm/2.0° visual angle and
presented against gray background. The inset bars varied in
height over a sequence of a fixed number of samples. The height
of each bar was selected depending on the trial condition. In
experiment 4 only, a large rectangular outline surrounded the
bars at all times. The color of the outline was black during the
presentation of masks and after the stimuli presentation, but
changed on each presentation frame to indicate the dimension
on which the two job candidates were assessed. We used three
dimensions (intelligence, motivation, experience) and three
colors [r–g–b: C1 = (255–204–204), C2 = (176–196–222), C3 =
(255–255–204)]. The mapping between the dimensions and col-
ors was counterbalanced across participants.
Trial Time Course. Each trial began with two black rectangle
outlines (placeholders) for 150 ms and a black central fixation
circle (radius, 10 px/2.5 mm/0.25°) that remained on screen
during stimulus presentation. The next frame contained a mask
stimulus, in which two dark gray bars occupied fully the place-
holders (50 ms) followed by a sequence of white bars of varying
height presented within the rectangular placeholders (200 ms
each, followed by a 200-ms “blank” interval where the outline
rectangles appeared empty), and finally a second mask identical
to the first (50 ms). In slow trials only, in experiment 2, bars were
presented for 800 ms each, followed by a 200-ms blank interval.
In all experiments, immediately following the second mask, the
fixation circle turned white, prompting participants to respond.
In experiment 4, a rectangular outline surrounded the presented
bars. The outline changed color on every frame (filled bars and
blank periods) signaling the dimension on which the two candi-
dates were assessed (Fig. S2C). The outline was black during the
presentation of masks and before for participants’ responses
following the presentation of the sequences. Responses in all
experiments were made using the keyboard arrow keys, left and
right (with index and ring fingers of the dominant hand, re-
spectively), corresponding to the chosen sequence’s screen po-
sition. When feedback was provided, the fixation circle turned
green for correct and red for incorrect responses (300 ms). When
feedback was withheld (44% of trials in experiment 1 and 57% of
trials in experiment 4, including in both cases all cyclic trials and
20% of noncyclic trials), the fixation circle turned black re-
gardless of the participant’s response. Participants in experi-
ments 1 and 4 were told that informative feedback is provided in
a subset of trials only but performance-based rewards will de-
pend on their accuracy in all trials.
Experimental Conditions. In experiment 1, cyclic trials were based
on a set of prototypical sequences, labeled “A sequences.” Each
A sequence (i.e., Aj with j = 1. . .n) was based on three baseline
numbers (corresponding to bar height), labeled xα,   xβ, and xγ.
These numbers were sampled from a normal distribution with its
mean distributed uniformly between 110 and 130 (pixels) and a
SD of 4. Each of these sequence-specific numbers was associated
with an increment value, labeled δx (i.e., δα,   δβ   , δγ), which was
sampled from a uniform distribution [δx∼Uð10, 20Þ].
Each Aj sequence consisted of the following nine samples:
Aj =

xα − 2δα,   xα − δα,   xα,   xβ − 2δβ,   xβ − δβ,  
xβ,   xγ − 2δγ ,   xγ − δγ ,   xγ

.
For each Aj sequence, a corresponding Bj sequence was con-
structed by performing a right circular shift on each one of
the three subsets of the Aj sequence (i.e., a separate shift
for xα − 2δα,   xα − δα,   xα, for xβ − 2δβ,   xβ − δβ,   xβ, and for xγ −
2δγ ,   xγ − δγ ,   xγ):
Bj =

xα,   xα − 2δα,   xα − δα,   xβ,   xβ − 2δβ,   xβ − δβ,  
xγ ,   xγ − 2δγ ,   xγ − δγ

.
Finally, for each Bj sequence, a corresponding Cj sequence was
constructed via a right circular shift of the Bj sequence (see
above) such that:
Csequence =

xα − δα,   xα,   xα − 2δα,   xα − δβ,   xβ,  
xβ − 2δβ,   xγ − δγ ,   xγ ,   xγ − 2δγ

.
Therefore, streams in cyclic trials had overall equal values, and
thus there was no objectively defined correct answer. Also, in each
(i) A vs. B, A won locally over Bmore often; in (ii) B vs. C, B won
over C more often; and in (iii) A vs. C, C won over A more often
(Fig. 1B). In the long version of experiment 1, 60 unique A–B–C
triplets were generated per participant, resulting in 60 trials for
each A vs. B, B vs. C, and A vs. C pairwise comparisons. In the
short version of the experiment, there were 40 unique triplets.
The two increment conditions were constructed in two ways:
(i) by adding a constant of 6 pixels to all samples of the Aj se-
quences (A+ vs. B), or (ii) by adding a constant of 6 pixels to all
samples of the Bj sequences (A vs. B+).
As in cyclic trials, the presentation order of the pairs within a
given trial was randomized.
In standard trials, the bar heights were generated from Gaussian
distributions. These trials acted as “fillers” that obscured the trial
structure in cyclic and increment trials and also provided an
independent measure of accuracy. The mean of the high (i.e.,
correct) sequence (SH) was randomly sampled from a uniform
distribution [μH ∼Uð80, 120Þ in pixels]. The mean of the low
sequence (SL) was decreased by 6 pixels (μL = μH − 6). The SDs
of the two sequences could be either high or low (σH = 20,
  σL = 10) resulting in the following four conditions:
iÞSH ∼NðμH , σLÞ  and  SL ∼NðμL, σLÞ,
iiÞSH ∼NðμH , σHÞ  and  SL ∼NðμL, σHÞ,
iiiÞSH ∼NðμH , σHÞ  and  SL ∼NðμL, σLÞ, and
ivÞSH ∼NðμH , σLÞ  and  SL ∼NðμL, σHÞ.
The sequences generation process was constrained such that
the sampled means and SDs did not deviate from the nominal
ones more than 3 units (pixels). The Gaussians were truncated
such that the sampled height was within the placeholders
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(range 0–200 pixels). Accuracy differences in iii and iv provide
extra leverage in fitting the selective integration model, since
the model predicts a “provariance” bias (14), i.e., higher ac-
curacy in iii compared with iv.
Experiments 2 and 3 consisted of standard and increment
conditions only (six conditions in total). In experiment 2, we
manipulated the presentation rate of the bars in a blockwise
fashion (fast/slow). In experiment 3, we randomly interleaved
short (six samples) and long sequences. Finally, experiment 4 was
analogous to experiment 1, featuring nine conditions overall.
There were two differences: (i) that pairs of bars were assigned to
specific dimensional labels (intelligence, motivation, and expe-
rience of a job candidate), and (ii) that the cyclic trials were
created from a single A–B–C triplet (i.e., with fixed dimensional
values) per participant. Associating each pair of bars with a
different dimension allowed us to randomize the presentation
order of the pairs in the cyclic trials, while keeping A–B–C
physically intact (i.e., effectively randomizing the presentation
order of the three dimensions). In noncyclic trials, pairs of bars
were randomly assigned to the three dimensions. Because se-
quences in experiment 4 had only three items, the mean differ-
ence between the two alternatives in noncyclic trials increased to
12 pixels to compensate for the higher difficulty due to the short
sequences length. Similarly, to compensate for the larger impact
of internal noise due to the short length, the value of the in-
crement δx in cyclic trials was set to 30 pixels [compared with
δx ∼Uð10, 20Þ in experiment 1]. In increment trials, the in-
crement value was sampled from δx ∼Uð20, 40Þ.
Design. There were two versions of experiment 1 (n = 28) that
differed just in the number of trials performed by each partici-
pant. Twelve participants performed 400 trials (short group),
whereas 16 participants performed 600 trials (long group). In the
long group, there were 300 standard trials (75 trials per condi-
tion), 120 increment trials (60 in each condition), and 180 cyclic
trials (60 per condition). In the short group, there were 200
standard trials, 80 increment trials, and 120 cyclic trials. Behavior
between the two groups was indistinguishable. Trials from all
conditions were randomly interleaved and presented in eight
blocks. The left/right position of the streams was randomized.
Feedback was offered following choices in 80% of standard and
increment trials, where choice correctness could be objectively
defined. Feedback in all cyclic trials was withheld. Because of
partial lack of feedback, we indicated midway each block
whether accuracy in the preceding trials (excluding cyclic trials
where there was no correct answer) increased (an improvement
above 5%), decreased (a drop of 5%), or stayed the same (any
change in-between) compared with all previous trials thus far.
In experiment 2 (n = 17), we manipulated the presentation
rate of the bars in a blockwise fashion. In all trials, participants
observed 12 pairs of bars. In “fast” blocks, the pairs were pre-
sented at a standard rate (200 ms followed by 200-ms blank),
whereas in the “slow” condition the filled white bars stayed on
screen for longer (800 ms followed by 200-ms blank interval).
Participants performed 432 trials that were divided in eight
blocks (54 trials each). There were six conditions (four standard
and two increment conditions), resulting in 36 trials per condi-
tion and presentation rate. The order of “normal” and slow
blocks was controlled such that block type alternated between
consecutive blocks. Full feedback was provided. The construc-
tion of the prototypical A, B, C sequences was based on four
triplets to produce 12 pairs of bars in increment trials.
In experiment 3 (n = 27), we presented participants with
standard and increment trials and full feedback. We manipulated
the length of the sequences from 6 to 12. The construction of A,
B, C sequences was adapted for each sequence length (i.e., using
two and four triplets, for sequence length of 6 and 12, re-
spectively). Overall, participants performed 720 trials divided
into eight blocks. There were six conditions (four standard and
two increment conditions) for each sequence length (60 trials for
each condition and sequence length). Trials of different se-
quence length were randomly interleaved.
Finally, in experiment 4 (N = 21), we presented cyclic, stan-
dard, and increment trials as in experiment 1, with partial
feedback (in 80% of the noncyclic trials). Procedures and block
structure were identical to experiment 1 except that each trial
consisted of three pairs of bars, corresponding to three dimen-
sions on which the two hypothetical candidates of each trial were
assessed. Each dimension was associated to a unique color
(Stimuli). Each frame (i.e., pair of bars) was presented within a
colored rectangular outline that described the active dimension.
Participants were provided with a hard copy of the dimensions/
colors associations and were encouraged to consult this copy as
needed during the task. At the end of the experiment, they were
asked to match the colors with the dimensions, and all partici-
pants were able to do so with 100% accuracy. We presented
1,458 trials in 18 blocks (with each block containing 81 trials and
lasting ∼4 min each; a 30-min break was offered after block 9).
To ensure that choices in cyclic trials were independent from
each other, we pseudorandomized the presentation order of the
trials such that two cyclic trials never appeared consecutively. As
in experiment 1, we indicated midway each block whether ac-
curacy in the preceding 40 trials (excluding cyclic trials) in-
creased (an improvement above 5%), decreased (a drop of 5%),
or stayed the same (any change in-between) compared with all
previous trials thus far. Trials were distributed evenly across the
nine conditions, resulting in 162 trials per condition.
Statistical Analyses. Null hypotheses were rejected at α= 0.05
unless stated otherwise. Mean choice responses in the three cy-
clic conditions in experiment 1 and 4 were compared with chance
level using two-sided one-sample t tests relative to 0.5, and sig-
nificance was assessed at a Bonferroni-corrected α= 0.05=3 (Fig.
2B and Fig. S2D). The frequent-winner effect in increment trials
in experiments 1 and 4 was assessed via paired t tests in the two
increment conditions, using accuracy as dependent variable. In
experiments 2 and 3, the strength of the frequent-winner effect
in increment trials was assessed and compared across different
conditions by inspecting the main effect of trial type and the
interaction in the 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA, respectively
(e.g., trial type by presentation speed in experiment 2, Fig. S2A;
trial type by sequence length in experiment 3, Fig. S2B). The
accuracy difference in the standard trials as a function of con-
dition (presentation speed and sequence length in experiments 2
and 3) was assessed with paired t tests and using as dependent
variable the pooled accuracy over the four types of standard trials.
In the cyclic trials (experiments 1 and 4), a proxy of selective
gating is the deviation from chance of the preference for the
frequently winning alternative. To assess the significance of this
deviation for each participant, we pooled the number of times that
each participant chose A over B, B over C, and C over A, in the
corresponding cyclic trials and used a one-sample z test
for proportions (H0 :P≤ 0.50;H1 :P> 0.50; n= 180 in experiment
1/long group, n= 120 in experiment 1/short group, and n= 486 in
experiment 4).
For experiment 4, weak stochastic transitivity (WST) was tested
within each individual using a recently developed toolbox and the
corresponding QTEST (41). Before applying the QTEST, it is
necessary to assess whether individual choices in the cyclical trials
are independent from each other. We assessed that by applying
the relevant test of independence described elsewhere (42).
Ultimately, for three alternatives A, B, and C, and the three
binary comparisons between them (as in our cyclic trials: A vs. B,
B vs. C, and A vs. C), QTEST aims to assess for each partici-
pant whether all of the possible transitive preference orders
(A≻B≻C;A≻C≻B;B≻A≻C;B≻C≻A;C≻A≻B;C≻B≻A,
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with X ≻ Y denoting that X is preferred over Y) are significantly
rejected at α= 0.05. If so, WST is violated significantly. The sta-
tistical details and other technicalities of this test are thoroughly
discussed elsewhere (22, 41). Here, we used the QTEST for WST,
with a supermajority level of 0.5 and a sample size of 1,000. Finally,
we asked whether participants violated a more stringent transitivity
test, that of triangle inequality. Triangle inequality states that, if
PðAjfA,BgÞ+PðBjfB,CgÞ−PðAjfA,CgÞ≤ 1, then violations of
WST can be consistent with a rational mixture model (20) (i.e., a
model in which preferences on each moment are sampled from a
distribution over transitive preference orders).
In individual analyses, the probability that all participants who
showed a significant result at α= 0.05 (e.g., proportion z test,
WST test) constituted “false alarms” was assessed using the bi-
nomial distribution function. In particular, we calculated the
probability of getting X out of Y significant participants at
α= 0.05 as 1−FðX − 1;Y , αÞ, with F being the binomial distri-
bution function.
Model Input and Parameter Values. For simplicity, in Fig. 3 and Fig.
S3, we explored models without leak. In Fig. 3B, the inputs to the
two alternatives were distributed around 100 (correct) and 95
(incorrect) with a SD of 10 (corresponding to early noise). Late
noise was varied across five levels (lines), whereas w was varied in
the 0–1 range in steps of 0.05. Accuracy predictions were obtained
by simulating the model for 12 time steps and 1,000,000 trials for
each combination of w and late noise. In Fig. 3D, the bivariate
distributions of the models’ accumulator states in a trial are de-
picted after 12 samples are accumulated. These distributions were
derived numerically. For the bottom panels, late noise was set
to 15. In Fig. S4A, the SD of early and late noise varied between
4 and 20 (in steps of 2). The reward-maximizing w was exhaustively
searched in the 0–1 interval in steps of 0.0125. Accuracy predic-
tions were obtained by simulating the model for 12 time steps and
5,000,000 trials for each combination of w, early and late noise.
Alternative Models. As discussed in the main text, we considered
alternative models that could also predict the frequent-winner ef-
fect. These models involved divisive and range normalization and a
“majority of confirming dimensions” (MCD) heuristic. The divisive
normalization model (23), before accumulating the attribute values
for each alternative, divides them by the total value on the corre-
sponding attribute. Similarly, the range normalization model (24)
divides the attribute values by the range of values (max minus min)
on the attribute under consideration. Qualitative predictions of
these models are given in Tables S3 and S4.
A third model we considered was an MCD heuristic that tallies
up the number of winning attributes for each alternative (25).
Because this heuristic appears to be a simple and natural ex-
planation for the frequent-winner effect, besides presenting
qualitative predictions of the model in Tables S3 and S4, we
implemented and fitted parametric versions of MCD. The model
tallies up the number of locally winning samples for each alter-
native (input: +1 for local winner, 0 for local loser). We created
three versions of MCD, which are described below:
i) a three-parameter model featuring leak (at the accumula-
tors’ level), late noise, and a parameter γ, which dictated
how much larger a target sample needs to be to be counted
as a local winner (if the difference was smaller than γ, both
accumulators received 0 input);
ii) a three-parameter model as above, but with late noise re-
placed by early noise;
iii) a four-parameter model including, leak, early and late noise,
and γ.
Without the γ parameter MCD models predict that the ac-
curacy in the “infrequent-winner” increment trial (A, B+) would
be below chance. This parameter together with the early- and
late-noise parameters were included to improve the quantitative
flexibility of the MCD models.
Model-Fitting Procedures.Variants of the selective integration and
MCD models were fitted to each participant’s data separately,
using maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation. For each partici-
pant in experiment 1, each model was fitted to K = 9 data points
corresponding to the mean choices in the nine experimental
conditions. Each model was simulated using the actual se-
quences that participants saw in the experimental trials, repeated
200 times for each trial to increase estimation robustness to
simulation noise. For each model, we first constructed an
M-dimensional grid search, with M corresponding to the number
of free parameters. To illustrate, for the full selective integration
model, the 4D grid consisted of the following dimensions:
(i) the leak parameter λ, which varied across 20 values (0, 0.0158,
0.0316, . . ., 0.3); (ii) the early-noise parameter σ that had also 20
values (0, 5.2632, 10.5263, . . ., 100); (iii) the late-noise parameter
ξ, having values as per σ; (iv) the selective integration parameter
w that varied across 20 values (0, 0.0526, 0.1053, . . ., 1). The grid
was searched exhaustively, and for each parameter set, ϑj, the
likelihood term was calculated as follows:
L

ϑj

=
YK
i

ki
yi

ðpiÞyið1− piÞki−yi ,
where ki is the number of experimental trials for the ith condi-
tion, yi is the number of correct responses (or responses for A, B,
C in the three types of cyclic trials, where correctness is not
objectively defined) for a given participant, and pi is the proba-
bility correct (or probability of choice in cyclic trails) predicted
by the model. The 30-parameter sets that had the highest likeli-
hood were subsequently fed into a SUBPLEX optimization rou-
tine (with the negative log-likelihood being the cost function)
(43), which extends the multidimensional simplex Matlab algo-
rithm to better handle noisy functions. At the SUBPLEX stage,
each trial was repeated 400 trials to further reduce fluctuations
in the cost function due to noise in the models. Parameters were
constrained in the range indicated above. We denote the best-
fitting parameter set identified by the SUBPLEX with ϑmle.
The same procedure (excluding now the MCD variants from
the comparison) was repeated for experiments 2–4. In experiment
2, we fitted K = 6 data points per participant. Data from ex-
periment 2 were not fitted using separate parameters for the two
presentation speed conditions due to nonsignificant behavioral
differences between slow and fast trials. For experiment 3 and 4,
K = 12 and K = 9 data points were fitted, respectively.
Model Comparison. To quantitatively compare different models
(i.e., variants of selective integration and MCD), we calculated
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for each observer and
each model:
BIC=−2lnðLðϑmleÞÞ+M · lnðCÞ
(M number of free parameters; C number of trials), and counted
the proportion of participants each model yielded the minimum
BIC value.
For all experiments (Fig. S1) we compared the following se-
lective integration variants:
i) the full model consisting of four parameters,
ii) a three-parameter model without late noise, and
iii) a three-parameter model without early noise.
For experiment 1 only, we added to the comparison three
variants of the MCD model (Alternative Models).
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Parameter Recovery.We tested the ability of the fitting procedure
to accurately identify the parameters of the best-fitting selective
integration model (the one omitting early noise, see Fig. S1 B–D).
Toward this aim, we obtained the model’s mean choice pro-
portions for the nine conditions in experiment 1, using 400 pa-
rameter sets. These sets were created by drawing randomly and
independently from: ξ∼Uð0, 30Þ,w∼Uð0.7, 1Þ, λ∼Uð0, 0.3Þ (the
range of parameter values corresponded roughly to the range of
participants’ estimated parameters in all experiments). For each
parameter set and each condition, mean choice was obtained by
simulating the model for 200 trials (cf. with 60–75 trials in the long
version of experiment 1). The artificial mean choice data were
fitted with the same procedure used to fit the experimental data.
SI Results
Within-Participants Analyses. For the cyclic trials in experiment 1,
we tested whether each participant chose the frequently winning
alternative (A in A vs. B, B in B vs. C, and C in A vs. C) more
often than the infrequently winning one by performing a one-
samples z test for proportions. This test quantifies the frequent-
winner effect and was significant for 17 out of 28 participants.
The probability of all these individuals corresponding to type 1
error (under the null hypothesis that there was no frequent-
winner effect or, equivalently, that w= 0 in the selective in-
tegration model) was negligible (P= 10× 10−16). For experiment
4, 15 out of 21 participants showed a significant frequent-winner
effect with the probability of them corresponding to type 1 error
being also negligible (P= 1.2× 10−15Þ.
Before assessing violations of transitivity in experiment 4, we
fist examined whether the “independent and identically distrib-
uted” assumption held for choices in cyclic trials. Applying the
relevant test (42) 62 times (3 cyclic trials × 21 participants), we
found deviations outside the 2 SE interval only four times.
Proceeding to individual-participants analysis in the cyclic trials
revealed significant violations of WST in 11 out 21 participants.
The probability of all these participants to constitute type I error
was very small (P= 1.1× 10−9Þ. One of these participants violated
WST in the opposite direction than the one predicted by selec-
tive integration (i.e., C over B, B over A, A over C). This partici-
pant was swayed by large differences, perhaps being insensitive (or
not perceiving) smaller and more frequent differences. This pat-
tern is not directly obtained within the current implementation of
the selective integration model. Notably, some of the participants
showed a significant frequent-winner effect (corresponding to
w> 0Þ but did not violate WST significantly. These participants had
a relatively lower w and/or high noise that masked the behavioral
manifestation of intransitivity. The discrepancy between the two
effects would be minimized if the experiment contained a larger
number of trials (i.e., had higher power) to statistically facilitate the
detection of WST violations of smaller magnitude. Individual
participants’ choice probabilities, number of trials performed, and
transitivity tests are given in Table S5.
Ruling Out Spurious Explanations of Intransitivity. It has been re-
cently argued that some probabilistic choices that violate WST
can derive from preferences that are transitive on each trial but
change across trials under the influence of latent variables (20).
For example, a rational agent could prefer A to B to C in one-
third of the trials, B to C to A in another third of the trials, and C to
A to B in the rest of the trials. When averaging choice behavior
across trials, this agent will prefer two out of three times A to B, B
to C, and C to A, appearing thus to violate WST (an analog of
the Condorcet paradox in voting theory, hereafter “aggregation
artifact”). In response to that possibility, Regenwetter et al. (20)
suggest that “true intransitivity” occurs only when aggregation
artifacts are ruled out and preferences are intransitive on specific
times or trials. Such artifacts are certainly ruled out when the
triangle inequality is violated (20), i.e., intransitivity occurs when
P(A over B) + P(B over C) – P(A over C) > 1 is satisfied. Al-
though 3 of 21 of our participants violated this stricter triangle
inequality criterion, most of the other participants showed
weaker violations (Table S5). This may raise concerns that the
WST violations in those participants are an artifact of averaging.
In our paradigm, the only obvious factor that could potentially
generate preference variability across trials is the recency effect
(Fig. S1A) in conjunction with the randomized presentation or-
der of the different dimensions. Due to recency, the three di-
mensions will be weighted differently on different trials (i.e., the
dimension that is presented last will be overweighted). Addi-
tionally, the frequently winning alternative, having a higher value
in two out of three samples, will end up with a winning sample
two out of three times. We thus examined whether the mere
presence of a recency effect could produce a frequent-winner
effect (and consequently WST violations) of the magnitude ob-
served in our data.
In the absence of any processing noise, a recency bias due to
leaky integration will produce a frequent-winner effect without
necessitating selective gating.When noise is present, however, the
leak-induced frequent-winner effect dissipates fast (Fig. S3A). In
Fig. S3B, we plot the choice probabilities in cyclic trials predicted
by the selective integration model in the absence of selective
gating (w = 0) (i.e., using the best-fitting leak and late-noise
parameters for each participant; we treat this as a leak-only
control simulation). Across participants, the predicted choice
probabilities show negligible deviations from chance, suggesting
that WST violations due to an aggregation artifact are unlikely.
Simulating 2,000 experimental sessions with the leak-control
model for the two “worst-case” participants, whose predicted
probabilities diverged the most from chance (participants 2 and
8), revealed a negligible number of significant WST violations,
well within the conventional type I error rate (3.2% in partici-
pant 2 and 0.15% in participant 8). A complementary argument
against leak-induced WST violations comes from a partial cor-
relation among the selective integration model parameters and
the frequent-winner effect. This analysis revealed a significant
and strong correlation between the frequent-winner effect and w
(r = 0.84; P < 0.001) and no correlation between the frequent-
winner effect and the leak parameter (r = −0.05; P = 0.836). This
is not surprising because a model with leak and no selective
gating fails to explain other empirical aspects, such as the pro-
variance effect, and thus would not provide a good fit.
In sum, we have no indication that the violations of WST in our
task were obtained as an aggregation artifact from a pure leaky
integrator. Beyond the recency bias, it can still be argued that
WST violations occur as an averaging artifact (over temporally
changing transitive preferences) due to subjective reasons or
exogenous factors that are not under experimental control. For
example, in real-life decisions, an individual may prefer meat to
fish to salad on Mondays, fish to salad to meat on Wednesdays,
and salad to meat to fish on Fridays, knowing that onMondays the
meat specialist is in charge, on Wednesdays that the fish is fresh,
and on Fridays that the salad is on special offer. Such subjective
reasons and exogenous factors are implausible in the context of
our well-controlled psychophysical experiment. Given that, as
well as the excellent fit of our model to the data (including ad-
ditional aspects such as the provariance effect), we maintain that
the evidence presented here strongly supports the thesis that
intransitivity in our task is due to selective integration rather than
due to aggregation artifacts.
Correlation Between Late Noise and Selective Gating. When calcu-
lating the correlation between estimated late noise and selective
gating (w), we used the parameters of the best-fitting variants of
selective integration. In all experiments, this was the variant
that omitted early noise (Fig. S1 B–E). The superiority of this
variant was consistent with the fact that in the full model (i) the
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early-noise parameter was estimated to negligible values as op-
posed to the late-noise parameter that was much higher (Fig.
S1F). When including the leak parameter in a partial correlation
with late noise and w, the results remained unaffected: w and late
noise remaining correlated (r = 0.48; P < 0.001), and leak and w
were uncorrelated (P = 0.238).
BA
C D E F
Fig. S1. Recency effect and model comparison. (A) A logistic regression assessed the impact of the temporal position of each pair on choice and revealed a
recency effect in experiments 1–4. This recency effect necessitated the use of a leak parameter in the models (Methods). (B) Percentage of participants that a
given model offered the lowest BIC in experiment 1. Selective integration with late noise only (labeled L; i.e., omitting early noise) scored better. Majority of
confirming dimensions (MCD) variants had much higher BIC scores than selective integration variants and consequently failed to score the lowest BIC in any
participant. (C) In experiments 2–4, the variant of selective integration with late noise only (L) also scored lower BIC values in more participants compared with
the other variants (E: early noise only; F: full model with early and late noise). (D) This three-parameter model that omits early noise is consistent with “late-
noise dominance” in the full model (F), which included both early and late noise (mean ± SE of late- vs. early-noise parameter values in the full model across all
four experiments: 14.38 ± 1.91 vs. 5.59 ± 0.58). Error bars correspond to 2 SEM. ***P < 0.001.
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Fig. S2. Behavioral results in experiments 2–4. (A) Accuracy in increment and standard trials in experiment 2 (n = 17) where the presentation speed was
manipulated within participants (experiment 2). (B) Accuracy in increment trials and standard trials in experiment 3 (n = 27), where the sequence length
changed randomly within an experimental block (experiment 3). (C) Time course of a trial in experiment 4 (n = 21). The colors–dimensions mapping was
randomized across participants (SI Methods). (D) Choices in cyclic trials in experiment 4 replicated the frequent-winner effect in experiment 1. WST was significantly
violated in 11 out of 21 participants who chose Amore often than B, Bmore often than C, and Cmore often than A (Table S5). (E) Participants in experiment 4 had
above-chance accuracy in both increment conditions, and the frequent-winner effect of experiment 1 was replicated [PðA+jfA+,BgÞ> PðB+jfA,B+gÞ]. Error bars
correspond to 2 SEM. ***P < 0.001; **P < 0.010; *P < 0.050.
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Fig. S3. Intransitivity predictions of noisy leaky integrator. (A) Probability of choice in the cyclic trials obtained by simulating a noisy leaky integrator (in 5,000
sessions using input sequences as per experiment 4). Leak and noise varied within the range of the corresponding best-fitting parameters. When leak is
present, intransitivity can be observed due to the randomization of the sequences and the recency bias. This pattern weakens and eventually dissipates in the
presence of noise. (B) Predictions of the noisy leaky integrator (5,000 sessions) using the best-fitting noise and leak parameters per participant and after setting
w = 0. Probability of choice on y axes is given for the first alternative in the corresponding binary set (i.e., A in {A, B}).
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Fig. S4. Optimal selective gating for early/late noise and parameter recovery in the model. (A) The optimal selective gating increases (brighter shades) as late
noise increases (Fig. 3B) and decreases (darker shades) as early noise increases. The latter effect is due to the fact that, as early noise increases, the local winner
becomes less and less predictive of the identity of the correct alternative. As a consequence, selective integration operates almost randomly and at a high cost,
which is not balanced out in the absence of strong late noise. Simulation details are described in SI Methods. (B) Generative parameters plotted against re-
covered parameters for late noise and (C) selective gating in simulated datasets (SI Methods). Red curves are linear regression lines. ***P < 0.001.
Table S1. Qualitative (deterministic) predictions for selective integration for a preference reversal scenario (9) after
the addition of an inferior decoy option in the choice set
Decision-relevant
quantities
Binary choice Ternary choice
Nominal
values
Selective
integration Nominal values Selective integration
A B A B A B D A B D
Attributes
Weather 35 10 35 0 35 10 5 35 10 0
Expense 15 30 0 30 15 30 25 0 30 25
Total values 50 40 35 30 50 40 30 35 40 25
Choice A≻B A≻B A≻B A≺B
The alternatives (A, Bali; B, Berlin, D: Dresden) are characterized by two attributes. Here, we used a variant of selective integration
that samples attributes in turn and integrates the two highest attribute values with equal gain while discounting the gain of the weakest
attribute value (by 1 − w, here w = 1). A smoother version of discounting, where the gains of the second best and worst attribute values
are both reduced (by 1 −w1 and 1 −w2, respectively), could produce the same qualitative result (provided thatw1 <w2, i.e., that the gain
reduction is stronger for the worst attribute value).
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Table S2. Qualitative (deterministic) predictions of selective
integration for all pairwise choices among three equally valued
alternatives (Fig. 1B)
Decision-relevant
quantities
Nominal
values A vs. B B vs. C A vs. C
A B C A B B C A C
Attributes
Weather 20 15 10 20 0 15 0 20 0
Expense 15 10 20 15 0 0 20 0 20
Culture 10 20 15 0 20 20 0 0 15
Total values 45 45 45 35 20 35 20 20 35
Choice A≻B B≻C A≺C
If noise is added (and the model predictions are probabilistic), the model
violates WST (Fig. 1B). The selective gating parameter was set to w = 1.
Table S3. Qualitative predictions for selective integration, divisive normalization range-normalization models, and majority of
confirming dimensions (MCD) for the frequent-winner effect (preference for A over B; Fig. 1B) that underlies intransitivity
Decision-relevant
quantities
Nominal values
Selective
integration
Divisive
normalization
Range
normalization MCD
A B A B A B A B A B
Attribute 1 20 15 20 0 2035
15
35
20
5
15
5 1 0
Attribute 2 15 10 15 0 1525
10
25
15
5
10
5 1 0
Attribute 3 10 20 0 20 1030
20
30
10
10
20
10 0 1
Total values 45 45 35 20 1, 5801, 050
1, 570
1, 050 8 7 2 1
Choice A∼B A≻B A≻B A≻B A≻B
The divisive normalization model divides each attribute value with the net value on that attribute. The range normalization model divides each attribute
value with the absolute difference (range) on that attribute. The MCD counts the number of winning dimensions for each alternative.
Table S4. Qualitative predictions for selective integration, divisive normalization, range-normalization and MCD models, for the
provariance effect (preference for C)
Decision-relevant
quantities
Nominal values
Selective
integration
Divisive
normalization
Range
normalization MCD
C D C D C D C D C D
Attribute 1 20 15 20 0 2035
15
35
20
5
15
5 1 0
Attribute 2 10 15 0 15 1025
15
25
10
5
15
5 0 1
Total values 30 30 20 15 170175
180
175 6 6 1 1
Choice C ∼D C ≻D C ≺D C ∼D C ∼D
For simplicity, we assumed that the high-variance option (C) varies between 10 and 20, whereas the low-variance option (D) has a fixed value of 15 in both
attributes.
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Table S5. Individual participants’ results and analyses in experiment 4
Probability of choice
Participant A over B B over C A over C No. of trials WST, P value Triangle ineq., P value
1 0.65 0.62 0.42 162 0.020 1.000
2 0.52 0.60 0.43 162 0.274 1.000
3 0.62 0.58 0.25 162 0.020 1.000
4 0.51 0.52 0.46 162 0.501 1.000
5 0.70 0.69 0.31 162 <0.001 0.119
6 0.57 0.55 0.55 162 1.000 1.000
7 0.49 0.45 0.60 162 0.364 1.000
8 0.61 0.60 0.46 162 0.169 1.000
9 0.80 0.81 0.18 162 <0.001 <0.001
10 0.67 0.80 0.33 162 <0.001 0.015
11 0.60 0.57 0.48 162 0.312 1.000
12 0.48 0.38 0.56 162 0.308 1.000
13 0.55 0.62 0.44 162 0.108 1.000
14 0.50 0.51 0.48 162 1.000 1.000
15 0.66 0.63 0.36 162 <0.001 1.000
16 0.57 0.59 0.38 162 0.030 1.000
17 0.36 0.36 0.60 162 0.006 1.000
18 0.58 0.58 0.38 162 0.021 1.000
19 0.72 0.66 0.29 162 <0.001 0.070
20 0.58 0.60 0.46 81 0.214 1.000
21 0.81 0.69 0.17 81 <0.001 <0.001
Bold indicates significant violations of transitivity tests at α= 0.05. Number of trials refers to each of the three
cyclic conditions. [Two participants (20, 21) completed only one session (i.e., one-half of the trials) due to a
technical error.] Details of the statistical tests are provided in SI Methods.
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